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Judging with and Legal Advising in International Organizations
C. F. Amerasinghe*
"Some people become great, others just grate."
I. INTRODUCTION

The last 31 years of my life have been spent as an international legal adviser, an
international "quasi-judge," and an international judge at the World Bank, the United
National Administrative Tribunal, and the Commonwealth International Arbitral
Tribunal. The experience covered not only the legal and judicial field, but also
diplomacy, management of people, and absorbing equally the iridescence of
"greatness" and the barbs of"graters".
My early experiences in the legal department of the World Bank provided me
with a solid foundation for my later work in the international administrative law field.

While in the legal department, apart from my routine work, I dealt with such issues as
expropriation, the developing law of the sea in the 1970s, and the development of the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID"). Additionally,
my academic work in the field served to supplement these professional endeavors.
BA (with First Class Honours), LLB, PhD, LLD, Cambridge University, LLM, Har-ard
University; Member, Institur de droit internationalh Judge, UN Administrative Tribunal; Judge,
Commonwealth International Arbitral Tribunal; Executive Secretary and Director. Secreariar,
World Bank Administrative Tribunal' Senior Counsel, Legal Department, World Bank.; Full
Professor of Law, University of Ceylon, Colombo; Adjunct Professor of Law, Washington College
of Law, American University Senior Fellow, Trinity Hall, Cambridge University. The author
received an appointment to the World Bank Legal Department specifically and expressly because of
his high academic achievements and credentials, which included entering the record books of
Cambridge University on his performance in the Classical Tripos Part I, in which he also achieved
First Class Honours, being placed first in his first year law examinations and second in the fital Law
Tripos Part II examination, both with First Class Honours, winning several prizes and merit
scholarships and studentships at Cambridge, including in 1964 the coveted Yorke Prize for a
research work in law which was published as a book, and being a Research Fellow at -arvard Law
School
1. I was elected to a three-year term on the UN Administrative Tribunal commencing in 1997 and
have opted out of standing for re-election for reasons which are reflected in the paper. I va elected
asJudge for the Commonwealth International Arbitral Tribunal in November 1999.
*
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Accordingly, not only was I able to develop my skills as an international lawyer and
jurist, but I was also able to contribute practically and intellectually to the solution of
problems, which helped me later in the World Bank Administrative Tribunal
("WBAT") and the United Nations Administrative Tribunal ("UNAT").
In the Legal Department of the World Bank (joined in 1970) where I later acted
as Chief Counsel, I had some interesting special assignments. The routine work itself
presented significant challenges concerning lending agreements for development
projects. The World Bank often missed its true purpose, namely as a development
agency for developing nations and not as a club primarily for the promotion of the
interests of the few rich capital exporting countries. For example, in regard to a palm
oil project, there was a feeling that the project should not jeopardize the interests of
direct or indirect competitors among the capital exporting member-States. In
principle, however, its justification lay solely in enabling the indigenous palm oil
industry which provided labor and income opportunities sustainably to develop and
flourish.2 In another case a project appraiser blindly tried to introduce high
environmental standards which the borrower could never practically and economically
have maintained because of the level of development of its economy and the expense
involved. The reason for introducing the standards was that they were imposed in the
appraiser's (European) country In both cases, however, the voices of the "graters"
were stilled.
My experience with the special assignments was on the Law of the Sea,
institutional law, and foreign investment law. My involvement in the UN Law of the
Sea Conference from 1973 to 1981 as an adviser to the President of the conference
was instrumental in bringing about, inter alia, a negotiated settlement of the problem
of the regime of islands and archipelagos. 4 The experience of that conference palpably
brought into focus how skilled diplomacy by international lawyers could result in

2. The project in Malaysia was approved and the loan made with the palm oil component.
3. The project for industrial development in Mauritius was approved largely with a modified
environmental protection covenant. In another project (Ports), after discussion, no environmental
covenant was included. Available online at
<http://www4.worldbank.org/sprojects/Project.asppid=PO01926>.
4. 1 wrote up my views on this subject soon after the UN Conference opened. See C. F. Amerasinghe,
The Problems of Archipelagoes in the International Law of the Sea, 23 Intl & Comp L Q 539 (1974). The
negotiated settlement took into account some of the article's basic ideas but was mostly the result of
extensive compromises as reflected in Articles 46-54 of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea
("UNCLOS") Treaty. The matter of the International Seabed Authority ("ISA"), which has
subsequently been the principal impediment to ratification of the UNCLOS by the United States
and some other States, also was of interest to the World Bank as a sponsor of developing countries.
For the principles underlying the positions formulated at the early stages of the negotiations, see C.
F. Amerasinghe, Basic PrinciplesRelating to the InternationalRegime of the Oceans at the Caracas Session of
the UN Law of the Sea Conference, 6 J Marit L & Comm 213 (1975).
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compromises and agreements in a world in which over 150 States had differing
interests.5
Between 1973 and 1978 I worked also on foreign investment disputes with
ICSID. My work consisted in the exploration and clarification of confused areas,
namely jurisdiction and submission to arbitration. I wrote an article for publication on
jurisdiction, and prepared a like paper for the centre's users. I argued that an ICSID
arbitral tribunal, like all international tribunals, was a juige d'exception (judge of
exception) withjuridictionattribu6 (assigned jurisdiction), so that jurisdiction had to be
dearly established in each case, and existed only to the extent consented to by the
parties I also demonstrated that there were fairly well defined conventional
limitations on the jurisdiction of an ICSID arbitral tribunal. By 1977, five of the six
cases registered since 1968 had been withdrawn by agreement, while only one had
been decided 8 Parties did not understand fully its jurisdiction and were reluctant to
engage the centre partially because it lacked a clear understanding of jurisdictional
issues. My studies helped clear the air.
Further, as ICSID was in its infancy at the time, neither foreign investors nor
States knew how effectively to invoke the centre's jurisdiction. Several of my written
works9 became basic in preparing the revisions of the "Model Clauses" which the
centre published from time to time. Its work at this infant stage concentrated on
jurisdictional matters and drafting of arbitration clauses. The work it had done helped
engender more informed and effective jurisdictional references. The manner in which
the centre was later invoked and the number of substantive awards given subsequently
reflected the effectiveness of this work. The centre was, thus, propelled into a new era
in the late 70s and early 80s when its use increased appreciably.

5. The United States, among other Stares, has not yet ratified the convention which, nevertheles, has
entered into force. The Chilean and Peruvian delegation and the Singaporean delegation were
particularly influential
6. C.F. Amerasinghe, TheJurisdiction of the InternationalCentrefor the Settlement cf Investr.ent Dputel,19
Indian J Intl L 166 (1979). A reduced version of this appeared as C. F. Amerasinghe, Juri-ttztn
Ratione Personae under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment DisFutes betwen States arl Nattr.as
of Other States, 47 Brit YB Ind L 227 (1974/75).
7. See C.F. Amerasinghe, 47 Brit YB Ind L at 227 (cited in note 6).
8. See Adriano Gardella SpA v Cte dlvoire, ICSID Case No ARB/74/1, Award (Aug 29,1977)
<http://wvm.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/condude.htm>.
9. My three principal but different articles on the model clauses are C. F. Amerasinghe, Me ClMuses
for Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes, 28 ArbJ 232 (1973); C. F. Amerasinghe, SubnArstrns to
t:
Jurisdictionof the International Centrefor Setlemnt of Investment Disputes, 5 J Maric L & Comm 211
(1974); C. F.Amerasinghe, How to Use the International Centrefor Set!ement of Inrcstr.mnt Dqtes bi
Reference to Its Model Clauses, 13 IndianJ Ind L 530 (1973).
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An important special assignment of mine was to study and advise on the
application of the World Bank's policy on expropriation of alien property."0 The
principal expropriations of foreign enterprises which attracted the World Bank's
attention at the time were the nationalizations of the US-owned International
Petroleum Company ("IPC") in Peru (1969) and of the US-owned copper companies
in Chile (1971). The issue was how did or should they affect the World Bank's
lending policy vis-a-vis Peru and Chile. The World Bank formulated its policy in
Operational Policy Statement ("OPS") No. 2.04 which stated that the World Bank
would not lend to a member-State, if it found that the position taken by that State
with respect to an alien's expropriated property was substantially affecting its
international credit standing. Thus the question was how far international law was
applicable in determining the impact of the expropriation on credit standing. I
answered this in a memorandum which stated that the OPS, could only mean that the
treatment would clearly be deemed to affect the credit standing of the host-State if the
requirements of international law were not satisfied in regard to the treatment of the
alien property upon expropriation. Accordingly, if those requirements were satisfied,
there was a very strong rebuttable presumption that credit standing would be deemed
unaffected.
In the case of Peru, the question was of the proper legal standard of
compensation. I advised that international law required "appropriate" compensation
(not necessarily "adequate" in the sense of "full" compensation) or a willingness to
negotiate an offer or dispute. This view was in accord with the practice of States, the
General Assembly resolution No. 1803 (XVII) of 1962, and the better opinion
expressed in the authoritative writings of international jurists." The World Bank
accepted this position finding in the case no circumstances warranting a conclusion
that credit standing would be affected. The IPC finally entered into negotiations with
Peru and the matter was soon settled. The IPC eventually accepted less than full
compensation. In the case of Chile, the issue was whether local remedies had been
exhausted in compliance with international law. I drew the General Counsel's

10. I had written extensively on the subject, principally, State Responsibilityfor Injuries to Aliens (Oxford
1967), as well as some contributions to international legal journals such as the AmJ Int L, the Intl &
Comp L Q, and ZAORV.
11. I dealt with and discussed the question of the quantum of compensation in my book, State
Responsibilities at 121-68 (cited in note 10). I have now further discussed the matter in, Richard
Lillich, ed, 3 The Valuation of NationalizedProperty in InternationalLaw 91 (Virginia 1975), and in C.F.
Amerasinghe, Issues of Compensation in the Taking of Alien Property in the Light of Recent Cases and
Practice,41 Intl & Comp L Q 22 (1992). It may be noted that the "Guidelines on the Treatment of
Foreign Direct Investment," 2 Legal Frameworkfor the Treatment of Foreign Investment 35 (Word Bank
1992) in Title IV deals entirely and regrettably with "full compensation" as the standard of
compensation, though admittedly it does not state explicitly that such standard is the only one. This
approach failed to take account of the developments in the 20th century, particularly, of the law.
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attention to certain failures on the part of the copper companies to seek proper
remedies in the Chilean courts with a view to securing compensation, the remedies
available not being clearly describable as "ineffective" according to international law."
The Bank did not immediately determine that international law had been violated,
and as a result, lending to Chile was not officially suspended. The copper companies
and Chile entered into negotiations which later resulted in a settlement. In both cases
the World Bank applied the current international law as a basic criterion for
determining how its policy under the OPS was to be applied.
II. THE WORLD BANK ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

In 1981, the Vice-President and General Counsel of the World Bank, Dr.
Golsong, worked with the President of the Bank to appoint me as the first regular
Executive Secretary and Director of the Secretariat of the World Bank
Administrative Tribunal, established in 1980." Prior to this appointment I had
worked on a few institutional matters while in the Legal Department, such as
membership and immunities and privileges. The fifteen and one-half years in the
WBAT enabled me to contribute not only to the advancement of respect for law and
order in personnel relations in the World Bank, but also to the cultivation of a culture
in the Bank for institutional and organizational law in a broad sense." The creation of
the WBAT was largely due to Dr. Golsong and his respect for human rights. He
certainly had a vision for the development of this needed organ in the World Bankwhich became within a short time one of the more respected (after the UNAT)
permanent international tribunals of its kind-and more generally for the
development of institutional law.
This vision extended to the initial appointments to the tribunals' bench. The
initial bench consisted of seven judges from different continents, legal systems, and
parts of the world. Some of them had no experience with personnel disputes or
international legal disputes of any kind. Among those appointed was a former
President of the International Court of Justice, Dr. Jimenez d'Ar&haga. In those
initial years, Dr. Jimenez d'Ar&haga (the first President of the WBAT for deven
years) helped make it what it became. My function was to provide judicial and legal
advice and to assist by conducting and supervising research and otherwise aiding in

12. The law of local remedies had been discussed in a chapter in my work, State Resonsibilityat 169-199
(cited in note 10). A subsequent book treated the subject more comprehensively. See CF.
Amerasinghe, Local Remedies in InternationalLaw (Grotius 1990).
13. See CF. Amerasinghe, The United Nations Ex'enses Case: A Contribution to &.:Law of Interrational
Organization,4 IndianJ Ind L 177 (1964), and CF. Amerasinghe, T CarerTravaux Prdparatoires
and United Nations Powers to Use Armed Force,4 Can YB Ind L 81 (1966).
14. The fact that I had been earlier elected to the prestigious Institut de droit international %,s a factor
in my election by Dr. Golsong to head the Secretariat of the WVBAT.
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the drafting of judgments. This involved me fully in the taking ofjudicial decisions
and preparing judgments.
As for the members of the Tribunal, some judges were effective, while some were
indeed disappointing. Many of the latter were from common law jurisdictions, and
had no experience or education in international law or in administrative (particularly
civil service) law, though they may have been high court judges or practitioners in
their jurisdictions. It became quite clear that national judicial experience by itself, even
at a high level, particularly in common law jurisdictions, did not qualify a lawyer to
function effectively on an international court such as the WBAT (or for that matter,
any international administrative court). Such judges were unable to draft the required
judgments, brought with them irrelevant experience in trying national cases (often of a
criminal nature), or were too set in their ways or unwilling to learn the law and
techniques which were new to them. There certainly were exceptions, as some judges
contributed to the tribunal's development by seeking extensive help from the
Secretariat in deciding cases. The help that the Secretariat gave was crucial.
There are considerable differences between the WBAT and courts composed of
more than one judge in a national jurisdiction. The WBAT has always sought a
consensus, and succeeded thus. In the twenty years of the tribunal's existence, all
judgments have been unanimous. However, on occasion a separate opinion, especially
by one of the more informed and perceptive judges, may have been useful in
elucidating reasoning which suffered from the overwhelming zeal for a consensus
opinion. There were at least a couple of instances, in which one or two of the
enlightened judges differed not only on the reasoning, but on the result, either
completely or partially, yet went along with the majority in both reasoning and result
because of the established tradition. I believe a separate opinion or a dissent is useful
and can influence future decisions, if it is well reasoned or adds to the clarity of the
majority opinion. The more effective judges were the ones who initially may have
differed, whether in reasoning or result, and their individual opinions could have made
a distinct positive contribution. On one occasion the first President took a line which
was different from the majority on both reasoning and result, but deferred to the
majority in order to have a consensus. If he had dissented and written an individual
opinion, I believe the jurisprudence of the WBAT would have been richer and been
influenced to take a more balanced course in the future, though the applicant would in
any event have lost the case. Far from taking away from the impact of judgments
which would remain the same, dissents, and particularly separate opinions, could lead
to development of a better jurisprudence and greater care in evaluating evidence in the
future.

The WBAT took some daring decisions in developing the law relating to the
abuse of discretion in administrative decisionmaking, a subject at the heart of
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international administrative law." It also used the experience of other International
Administrative Tribunals ('IATs"), particularly the UN tribunal. The WBATs
interest in being scrupulously accurate in applying the general principles of
international administrative law led to its support for efforts to compile the
jurisprudence and authoritative academic opinion in the field. Both the published
opinions of the WBAT and other IATs, as well as academic work on international
administrative law, 6 provide reference points for the development of the law.
Furthermore, during my tenure at the WBAT, I produced The Lat of the International
Civil ServiceY providing comprehensive coverage of IAT jurisprudence, an effort
previously unattempted. This work has enabled the existing IATs to develop a
consistent jurisprudence and demonstrated a broad interest that some of the WBAT
judges had in promoting the efficacy and success of international organizations apart
from their regular functions in adjudicating institutional personnel disputes. Better
judges were keenly interested not only in the accuracy on the law of individual cases
but in the preservation of consistency in international administrative law, application
of the proper principles and the creation of a corpus of accessible knowledge on the
jurisprudence of tribunals.'8 There was clearly a special vital interest in the rule and
efficacy of law.
As for method of operation, judgments were drafted by a rapporteur (usually a
judge but sometimes not). In any case, the Director of the Secretariat and his office
prepared the section of thejudgment on the facts and contentions of the parties. This
is all very different, I believe, from what happens in national jurisdictions, particularly
the common law ones, and even where lawyers clerk for judges. But in the
circumstances of a tribunal such as the WBAT, it made for maximum efficiency and
ensured appropriate reasoning and accuracy.
So broad was the interest of thejudges in international organizational matters, of
which the personnel area was only one, that the first President in 1991 agreed to have
a comprehensive book on the basic principles of international institutional law in
general. Dr. Jim6nez Ar&haga was aware of both my exposure to the institutional
aspects of international organizational law when I was in the Legal Department and
15. See, for example, Kingv IBRD, VBAT Decision No 131 (1993).
16. See, for example, C. F. Amerasinghe, TermtinationofPermanentAppointmentsftr UnsatofaaiorySc-ie in
InternationalAdministrative Law, 33 Intl & Comp L Q 859 (1934); C. F. Aeringhe and D.
Bellinger, Non-Confirmation of Probationary Appointments, 54 Brit YB Intl L 167 (1933); CF.
Amerasinghe, The World Bank AdministrativeTribunal,31 Ind & Comp L Q748 (1932).
17. CF. Arnerasinghe, The Law of International Civil Service (Oxford 1994). This work of about 1200
pages, originally published in 1988, won the American Society of International Law award for the
best publication in public international law. Two other relevant works I have wrten on
international administrative law are the 3 volumes of Case-Law of &e WcrUd Bark Admmutrauic
Tribunal(Oxford v 11989, v 2 1993, v 3 1997) and Documents on InternationalAdmmistrate Tr&e=!s
(Oxford 1989).
18. See de Merode, Decision 1, NVBAT Decision No 1, 13 (1981).
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my dealings with many institutional matters as Director of the Secretariat, apart from
those in the personnel area. The result was that in my leisure I worked on and was
able to produce a treatise on the institutional legal aspects of international
organizations.' 9
III. THE UN ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
My three-year stint from 1998 to 2000 as a judge of the UNAT was really a
further development of my work at the WBAT, though emphatically the judicial
function was at the heart of the exercise.
In the UNAT the seven judges met in panels of three. The UNAT decided
many more cases annually than the WBAT (more than fifty as compared with about
ten on the average), with less assistance from the Secretariat because, apparently, the
UN does not have the funds (among other things) to provide for the extensive
support required by such a volume of work. As a result the judges had much more
work. In principle, the system prevailing among the UNAT judges was the same as in
the WBAT, namely that collegiality and consensus were the basic premises, but most
of the work in drafting judgments was done by the rapporteur judge and other judges
on the panel, rather than by the Executive Secretary and his office. The efficiency,
skill, judicial acumen, legal knowledge, and even interest of the judges varied. Some
were better rapporteurs than others, but there was always an interest in producing a
coherent, well reasoned, accurate, and readable judgment. Citations were generally
confined to the decided cases of the UNAT itself. Dissents and separate opinions are
more acceptable than in the WBAT, but were still unusual.' The majority on the
panel does its best to convince the third member, with success generally, and
sometimes a fortunate judge in the minority persuades the other two to accept his
solution. There has been no attempt to standardize the style of judgments, each
rapporteur writing in his or her own style. Consequently, there is less emphasis on
uniform style than on consistency and reasoning, which is as it should be.

19.

See C. F. Amerasinghe, The Principles of Institutional Law of International Organizations (Cambridge
1996). I believe it is practically impossible for academics to understand fully international
institutional law without practical experience in an international organization of some importance. I
had been an academic for over eight years, with, additionally, a consulting practice in international
law, and a Full Professor of Law, but without my practical experience my writing on international
organizational law would nor have been so effective, indeed, even possible.
20. See, for example, Quassem (2000) (Amerasinghe, dissenting) (dissenting on the quantum of damages
while agreeing with the conclusion and reasoning on the merits); Al-Hafiz (2000) (Amerasinghe,
concurring). No other individual opinions had been written during my tenure.
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As a rule the judges are expected to speak both English and French, although
this is not always the case. The few judges who have come to the Tribunal lacking a
second language have still made great contributions.
The UNAT has in the last three years made some important pronouncements,
particularly in the field of the exercise of discretionary powers in disciplinary matters.
In the field of discipline we were careful to point out that the UNAT's review power
of decisions taken by the administration is fairly extensive, covering even the
characterization of what may amount to misconduct and the appropriateness of a
sanction in terms of proportionality.' The recent decisions have clarified and
formulated in well defined terms the scope of review in a sensitive area such as
discipline, which hitherto had been approached in a rather cursory and confusing
manner. No one will disagree that it is a matter ofjustice and fairness not only that a
tribunal should use the proper criteria and standards in reviewing disciplinary
decisions, but also that both staff members and the administration should have notice
of their rights and responsibilities and the basis for them. A good example of a recent
advance in the same area is the clarification of the law relating to the matter of the
burden of proof and of evidence in the exercise of disciplinary powers by the
administrative entity-7
In other areas such as dismissal from service, promotion, transfer, and fixed-term

contracts, the tribunal has developed the law applied hitherto, looking more dosely at
the parameters within which the administration should operate in exercising its
discretion to take administrative decisions. In this important area of discretionary
powers, which is sometimes troubled by confusion and vagueness, the UNAT has
recently tried to be as specific and definite as possible in stating the law resulting from
balancing the conflicting interests of the staff member in being treated with fairness
and equity and of the administration in being able to run an efficient organization.2'
This idea of recognizing, balancing and possibly reconciling conflicting interests has
recently been particularly emphasized.
21. During my tenure, the UNAT had three judges who were not bilingual-a US judge. the Irish
judge and the Congolese Judge. The Congolese judge, Mr. Victor Yenyi, who kneIv no English
when he came into the UNAT, took the trouble to learn the language and was later able to
understand discussions in English, though he drafted in French. He was a very skilledjudge, having
great judicial acumen and knowledge of international and civil administrative law and in spire of his
lack of English dearly made a great contribution to the Tribunal The Irish judge, Mr. Kevin
Haugh, in spite of his lack of French, also was a great contributor.
22. For cases dearly elaborating and stating the general principles applicable in disciplinary reviev, cam
see Edongo (2000); Kiwanuka, UNAT Decision No 941; Sbabrour,UNAT Decision No 939; Al Ard,
UNAT Decision No 932; Uggla, UNAT Decision No 898; Jkuthi, UNAT Decision No 897,
Augustine, UNAT Decision No 890.
23. See, for example, Edongo, para VI, Kiwanuka,para VIII, andjbutbi, para IV.
24. See the statement to the latter effect in Kiwanuka, para IV.
25. See, for example, cases cited in note 23 above.

Springm
2oi

(icagoJourna(of

nternationafLaw

The UNAT not only deals with more cases than the WBAT, but generally has
to deal with somewhat more complicated and sensitive issues, particularly because of
the variety of functions that the UN performs as compared to the World Bank and,
rather surprisingly, because of the UN's impecuniosity. The WBAT generally heard
bad cases because the good and borderline cases were settled prior to adjudication by
the tribunal, the World Bank being a fairly wealthy organization that generated its
own income. The result was that the vast majority (between 70 and 75 percent) of
cases went against staff members. In the case of the UNAT, everything, whether of a
minor or major nature, generally ends up before the tribunal, because the ability to
settle is not so easily available on account of the lack of financial means. As a result, a
large proportion (50 to 60 percent ) of cases is decided in favor of staff members.
During my tenure in the UNAT there have been several landmark judgments
handed down with respect to many international administrative law issues, such as the
termination of service for unsatisfactory performance, disciplinary matters, and
promotion.m The tribunal began to realize that some of its earlier judgments were not
adequately explicit and sufficiently clear in their reasoning. In several cases the
tribunal discussed policy and principle before clarifying and applying law to the
dispute before it. This has contributed to the richness of the tribunal's jurisprudence.
Indeed, of late there have been more important and significant judgments given by the
UNAT than were given by the WBAT during my tenure years, or perhaps in the first
forty-eight odd years of the UNAT's existence.
IV.

CONCLUSION

There are many areas in which difficulties have been experienced in both
tribunals (UNAT and WBAT) because judges failed to realize that the law applied
was not any particular national law, a common denominator of national laws, the civil
law, nor the common law, but that it was a unique system known conveniently as
international administrative law. Nevertheless, it must also be conceded that the
unique system is based on the French and continental European systems of civil
administrative law (in particular, the law relating to the civil service) although not
identical with them. Further there is a sufficient rapport and community among the
various IATs for there to have developed a corpus of applicable common principles,
though each organization may have its own specific laws which are primarily
applicable.2 Most common law judges on IATs have problems with all these features,
unless, perhaps, they happen to be public international lawyers, which enables them to
develop a broader, so to speak, civil law and international organizational orientation.
Often, the purely common law judges have tried to apply principles from the common
26. See Nag, UNAT Decision No 940 (1999), Kbalil (2000) (nor yet published), Robbins (2000) (not yet
published) and cases referred to in note 23 above.
27. See de Merode at 13 (cited in note 18).
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law which are not relevant. This is a drawback to the smooth and proper functioning
of IATs.
My experience has been that unless a judge has had good exposure to public
international law, administrative law in the civil system, or perhaps labor law in the
common law system, it is difficult for him fully to appreciate the issues and subtleties
of the law applied by IATs. For this reason a careful look needs to be taken at the
qualifications required for being a judge of an IAT, such as the UNAT or the
WBAT. Judicial or even legal experience, as such, the latter may be practical or
academic, does not enable a judge to function efficiently on an IAT. Clearly, legal
experience should be a basic requirement , judicial experience, however high, is not.
On the other hand, general legal experience seems inadequate. A criminal lawyer as
such, whetherjudge, practitioner, or academic, for example, would be a poor fit. It has
become apparent that there must be, as a qualification, an added requirement of
experience in public international law, administrative law (civil law system), or labor
law, for example. Again while practical legal experience is desirable, academic legal
experience is adequate, because it is to the extent that a judge is a jurist that there is
sufficient basis for undertaking the judicial functions in an IAT. Perhaps an
important fact is being ajurist, rather than simply a person with legal experience, given
the exposure to the proper fields of law.
Most IATs, including the UNAT and WBAT, establish limited terms (for
example, two, three or four years) which may be renewed. I have a problem with
renewals as such. The point is that, unlike in the case of other tribunals and courts,
the authority making the initial appointment and renewal is the respondent in every
case. Does justice not only have to be done, but also seem to be done? Is there not an
appearancethat ajudge already appointed may give decisions in favor of the respondent
party in order to have his term renewed? Is there not a conflict of interest that is
created by the possibility of renewal? For this reason, I would eliminate renewals and
give judges of IATs a long single term, for example seven years.
I have already referred to dissenting and separate opinions. Apparently in civil
law jurisdictions these are not countenanced. However, both help to inject caution
and clarity for the future and improve the performance of international courts such as
IATs rather than deprive the principal judgment of force. Apart from that, diversity
of opinion is sometimes a healthy way of developing the law in the direction in which
it should go.
28. The Statute of the UNAT did nor specify qualifications at all The December 2000 amendment to
the Statute merely requires that the appropriate experience, including legal experience, be
considered. The WBAT Stature requires qualifications as a competent international jurist or as a
holder of high national judicial office. Neither of these is ideally complete, though legal experience is
a minimum. Any other experience in high national or any otherjudicial office is nor a necessity. The
UN has just elected to the bench of the UNAT an African (Sudanese) with no legal experience or
qualification'
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